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I. INTRODUCTION
Cyberspace and sophisticated computer technology are presenting new
opportunities for overcoming the challenges of conventional negotiation with
mutual gains bargaining. This Article briefly introduces the theory used in
solving negotiation problems with web-based negotiation support systems
and then describes a new product and negotiation process called "One
Accord" that uses optimization to take negotiators "beyond win-win." The
new concepts introduced in this Article are illustrated in the context of a
hypothetical environmental negotiation.
II. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
Following are some current challenges of conventional negotiation that
often prevent participants from achieving better outcomes.
A. Challenges to Effective and Efficient Negotiations
1. Adversarial Tactics
Our society places a high value on an individual's or entity's power and
rights, encouraging them to work hard and compete in order to succeed.1
Although competition can encourage high individual goals, competition in
negotiation often results in harmful adversarial tactics and inefficient results.2
2. Piecemeal Thinking
Without sophisticated tools to deal with the inherent complexity of most
real-world negotiations, decisionmakers are forced to deal with them
* President, One Accord Technologies <www.oneaccordinc.com>.
* Mediator & Settlement Counsel, Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP, Denver, Colorado
<www.dgslaw.com>.
I See Kenneth Ehrenberg, Social Structure and Responsibility, 5 LOY. POVERTY L.J.
1, 1-2 (1999).
2 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 756-57 (1984) (suggesting that
results often are limited when negotiators take an individualistic approach to
negotiations).
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piecemeal, that is, one issue at a time. Moreover, a piecemeal approach to
negotiation encourages positional rather than mutual gains bargaining.
3. Tedium
Giving adequate attention to important decisions tends to be very time
consuming, especially in multiparty negotiations. Because of the demands of
other important management and business tasks, negotiators often are
unprepared and have too little time or resources for the decisions required.3
4. High Cost
Drawn out negotiations involving professionals can be very expensive,
both in time and negotiation energy. 4
5. Irrational Decisions
Reasonable outcomes are compromised when decisionmakers make logic
errors, take short-cuts, or permit emotions to get the upper hand when under
the stress of intensive negotiations.5 Without properly assessing the risks,
parties are often unrealistically confident of a favorable outcome should the
matter be taken to court.
6. Complexity
Multiple issues and numerous possible outcomes can overwhelm
negotiators, causing them to make decisions based on heuristics and emotion
rather than reason. These problems are even greater in cases involving many
parties.
7. Win-Lose Outcomes
Negotiation based on low disclosure levels results in vague ideas about
reservation and aspiration levels of other parties and often misinterpretation
3 See Charles B. Craver, Mediation: A Trial Lawyer's Guide, TRIAL, June 1999, at
37, 40 (discussing the benefits of mediation in generating pretrial settlements).
4 See Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up
Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the Monster?, 19
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 239, 280 (1991) (discussing inefficiencies in hazardous waste
mediations).
5 See William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. REsOL. 367, 395 (1999) (addressing the benefits of a cooling off period).
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of the parties' real interests and needs.6 Tackling issues individually, as in a
one-dimensional, win-lose tug of war, inevitably leaves value on the table
unclaimed by any party. Parties either agree to a suboptimal 7 conclusion or
miss finding a mutually satisfactory outcome, even when it was actually
achievable.
B. Oppbrtunities with Negotiation Support Systems
New negotiation support systems built with powerful optimization
algorithms and enhanced by a maturing cyberspace are now providing a real
alternative to conventional negotiation in business arrangements as well as
the settlement of litigation. These new systems reduce negotiating time and
cost for decisionmakers in simple or complex cases by putting them in
control of a process that quickly clarifies tradeoffs, recognizes party
satisfaction on all types of negotiation issues, and generates optimal
solutions.
Internet connectivity now makes communication possible at a distance
by facilitating the exchange of offers and counteroffers while simultaneously
managing confidential information at a neutral site. When effectively used
with a trained neutral, this process eliminates or minimizes some of the
challenges of conventional negotiation and can provide much improved
negotiated outcomes. As such, the parties' decisions are based on more
complete and more thoroughly evaluated information. The parties not only
achieve the win-win goals of cooperation but also are able to go beyond win-
win with optimization.
The sophistication of systems such as those described above is best
employed by a qualified neutral facilitator whose role it is to provide
orientation and guidance through the process. The combination of a neutral
facilitator and an Internet site serves several purposes, as follows: (1) all
negotiating parties and the facilitator are automatically networked with one
another, no matter where they are located; (2) parties can exchange offers
and counteroffers easily via the Internet at their own convenience; (3) all the
power that is needed to "number crunch" a huge problem does not need to
reside on each party's desktop; and (4) private and confidential data is kept
safe and secure.
6 See HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OFNEGOTIATION 142 (1982).
7 Economists sometimes use the term "Pareto optimal" to describe an outcome that
cannot be made better for any party without making some other party worse off. See id. at
139.
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Il. EFFICIENCY FRONTIER
The basic theory underlying the optimization algorithms of negotiation
support systems can be illustrated effectively using the efficiency frontier
concept. As illustrated for a hypothetical case in Figure 1, the efficiency
frontier represents the best possible outcomes for all parties in a negotiation
case.8
0 ..........
Figure 1: Efficiency Frontier
Every potential resolution in a negotiation problem is associated with an expected satisfaction
level for each negotiating party. This Figure illustrates a plot of the expected relative
satisfaction of one party, Riverside Pulp and Paper, against the expected relative satisfaction
of another party, DEC. These parties are engaged in a hypothetical negotiation called DEC v.
Riverside, which is used for illustration later in this paper.9 Very rarely can two negotiating
parties both obtain 100% of what they want (top right comer as (100, 100)). However, parties
almost always can achieve more than fifty-fifty (center of graph). The efficiency frontier is a
line defining the greatest level of joint satisfaction that parties can get in a particular
negotiation.10
8 See id.
9 See discussion infra Part V.
10 In dynamic real-world cases, the location of the efficiency frontier is actually a
function of an evolving problem description and constantly changing party preferences.
This makes it a moving target, in contrast to the static representation in the example of
this Article.
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IV. THE ONE AccoRD PROCESS
One Accordu1 is a new negotiation support system that networks multiple
parties located anywhere in the world and manages their confidential
information with a neutral Internet site. This Part describes a multiphased
process in which One Accord uses optimization quickly to transform
conflicting objectives into fair and efficient solutions. Of course, it is
expected that during the process parties continually will compare options for
a negotiated agreement with trial risks or other alternatives to settlement. The
parties will continue with the process as long as they rationally can see the
advantages of settlement. With the aid of a facilitator, the parties proceed
through the various phases in the following sequence.
A. Qualify Interests
The focus in this phase is on quality rather than quantity. The parties
engage in a creative and cooperative process that describes the problem and
identifies all issues that must be resolved. Recognizing that a well-defined
problem is already half-solved, this task requires adequate attention to allow
success in subsequent phases. This initial phase is best conducted in joint
sessions with all parties and the facilitator present.
The main task in this phase is to build a Single Negotiating Form (SNF),
which is an outline of the desired agreement that contains blanks for the
unresolved issues. The emphasis of the SNF is on those unquantified blanks.
When parties have built the SNF they should be able to refer to the blanks to
identify a comprehensive and nonredundant list of all the unresolved issues
of the conflict (whether qualitative or quantitative).
While building the SNF, the facilitator also should help the parties
identify preliminary bargaining ranges for the issues represented by the SNF.
The facilitator should emphasize that this is not an opportunity to claim
value, but rather an exercise in collaboration. Establishing some common
ground early in the process will help parties establish confidence that
possible resolutions exist within their collective view of reasonability.
B. Quantify Satisfaction
After identifying the issues and possible ranges of resolution, the
facilitator assists parties individually to analyze their own priorities among
their interests and possible outcomes. Each party's task now is to input into
11 See Beyond Win-Win with One Accord (visited Apr. 9, 2000) <http://www.one
accordinc.com>.
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the One Accord software how that party can become satisfied on each of the
issues and thereby with any potential outcome. Intuitive preference
elicitation simplifies complex tradeoffs by having parties deal with
comparable issues in pairs. The private preferences quantified in this phase
are not shared with other parties. Rather, a patented neutral site on the
Internet keeps that information confidential and secure.
C. Establish Equity
Having worked individually to assess and define their own preferences,
parties now concentrate on determining how they should divide the benefits
of their collaboration. This usually is accomplished by agreeing on a
tentative solution. Parties expect the first tentative solution to be inefficient
and therefore agree that it will serve as a reference point from which to
search for improvements in the next phase.
D. Maximize Benefits
The tentative resolution found in the previous phase becomes a reference
point from which improvements can be generated. When requested, One
Accord generates a single package that proportions benefits according to
previously agreed upon influence.1 2
E. Secure Commitment
The goal of all negotiations is to secure a commitment from parties to
implement the decisions agreed upon. The parties' ability to secure
commitment, usually represented by a well-written final agreement,
determines the degree to which they will realize the benefits of the entire
process.
V. DEC v. RIVERSIDE PULP AND PAPER
In the remainder of this Article the One Accord process is illustrated in
the context of a hypothetical negotiation problem between the state
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and Riverside Pulp and
Paper (Riverside). 13 The conflict can be described briefly as follows.
12 By default, One Accord treats all parties equally. However, parties may agree
ahead of time to change the default by setting levels of relative influence for each party.
13 This case is used here with permission from the Program on Negotiation (PON) at
Harvard Law School. See Harvard Law Sch., Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law
School (visited Apr. 8, 2000) <www.pon.harvard.edu>. It is an adaptation of DEC v.
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Riverside is located beside the Deep River, which happens to be a
convenient place to discharge the effluent from its operation. The Deep
River's water quality has deteriorated over the years and an administrative
order has been issued by DEC requiring Riverside to improve the situation.
Because a demonstration project would be of great value, DEC is quite keen
on having Riverside install a new technology called the Technoclean
Scrubber. DEC is so motivated toward the Technoclean Scrubber that it
seems willing to include a guarantee, subsidy, insurance, and other
incentives. However, DEC also claims the authority to require Riverside to
shut down for as long as it takes to comply properly and to go through a
testing period. Not surprisingly, Riverside is unwilling to cooperate with
DEC's ideas for resolution of the conflict.
In the dynamic of real-world negotiations, one phase is seldom
completed before the next one begins, and an iterative process may bring a
party back to an earlier phase any number of times as the problem evolves
and is understood more thoroughly. However, for the sake of brevity, this
illustration assumes static party preferences and follows a simple sequential
progression through each phase.
VI. QUALIFY INTERESTS
Suppose that parties to this hypothetical case begin negotiating without
One Accord. DEC says that it should require Riverside to shut down for
several months while a scrubber is installed. However, if Riverside agrees to
install the new Technoclean scrubber, that requirement probably could be
waived. In this vein, DEC declares that the following proposal is generous in
order to encourage Riverside's use of the Technoclean:
Riverside Lumber, written by David Lax, James Sebenius, Lawrence Susskind, and
Thomas Weeks. For the purposes of this Article, and to conserve the uniqueness of the
PON case, details of the case have been changed substantially. Copyright is held by the
Program on Negotiation, from which DEC v. Riverside Lumber and other teaching
materials may be purchased for a nominal fee.
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DEC'S PROPOSAL
DEC and Riverside agree to the following conditions for disposal of
Riverside's effluent:
* Riverside will install a Technoclean scrubber.
* DEC will guarantee the scrubber and subsidize $10,000.
• DEC will provide $100,000 liability insurance.
* Riverside will not be required to shut down the paper and pulp
operations.
* DEC will spend $50,000 on a positive public relations campaign.
* DEC will give Riverside a compliance incentive of $100,000.
-to be signed and dated-
Riverside does not have confidence in the Technoclean Scrubber
technology and responds with a proposal based on the tried and proven
Rotoblue Scrubber. Because DEC wants Riverside to close down for several
months while a scrubber is installed, Riverside offers a compromise of a two-
month closure to appease DEC's constituency. Riverside bluffs about the
great burden of that concession, but in private in-house discussions has
decided that it actually could make good use of the down time.
RIVERSIDE'S PROPOSAL
DEC and Riverside agree to the following conditions for disposal of
Riverside's effluent:
" Riverside will install a Rotoblue scrubber.
* Because the Rotoblue is proven technology, DEC need not guarantee the
scrubber or subsidize it.
" DEC will provide $200,000 liability insurance.
* Riverside will close down for two months.
" DEC will spend $100,000 on a positive public relations campaign.
* DEC will give Riverside a compliance incentive of $150,000.
-to be signed and dated-
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A. Building a Single Negotiating Form
Compare the two proposals above, and especially notice the differences
in italicized typeface. DEC and Riverside have been concentrating on the
quantitative aspects of their negotiation. With One Accord, the parties are
encouraged by the facilitator to build an SNF like the following:
SINGLE NEGOTIATING FORM
DEC and Riverside agree to the following conditions for disposal of
Riverside's effluent:
* Riverside will install (a Technoclean, a Rotoblue, no)
scrubber
* DEC (will/will not) guarantee the scrubber and subsidize
* DEC will provide $ - liability insurance.
* Riverside will close down for months.
* DEC will spend $ _ on public relations.
" DEC will give Riverside a compliance incentive of $
-to be signed and dated-
The difference between this SNF and the proposals previously illustrated
is that there are blanks representing the unresolved issues. It is relatively easy
to agree to the use of this form. Each party can readily say, "That's fine with
me. Just fill in the blanks with what I want."
The process of qualifying interests is far from trivial, and the complexity
of the process depends on many factors, including the following: type of case
(e.g., commercial, environmental, personal injury); number of issues;
interrelationships among issues; number of parties; number of party
representatives; types of parties (e.g., corporations, individuals, institutions,
or governmental); whether third-party or constituency ratification is required;
customs, bargaining styles, and experience of the parties; degree of
cooperation among the parties; value of outcome to parties; risk tolerance of
the parties; degree of litigation uncertainty; and resource limitations (e.g.,
time, money, deadlines, and quality of technical and legal support).
Fortunately, there is much good literature on the above listed subjects.
Not surprisingly, every author presents his process steps somewhat
differently, depending on his assumptions about the character of the
negotiation. The following list of steps for a typical complex case is
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compiled and adapted from several sources including Raiffa, 14 Hansen, 15 and
Brin,16 as well as the experience of the authors of this Article.
1. Identify Interest Groups 17
2. Structure Participation (Contracting) 18
a. Appoint facilitator
b. Discuss process guidelines and goals
c. Arrange financing for the process
d. Select party representatives
e. Reach agreement on the process to be used
3. Conduct Training 19
a. Establish proficiency in support tools
b. Convey physical and legal reality of the context
4. Share Information, Interests, and Visions 20
5. Create Value Without Claiming in a Search for all Possible Resolutions 21
a. Paraphrase the issues
b. Brainstorm resolutions
c. Find new associations and arrangements
d. Look at the issues and resolutions from the broadest possible
perspective
6. Develop Single Negotiating Form22
Among the references listed, only Raiffa includes the final step of
developing the SNF.23 However, developing this form is a critical component
required for compatibility with the rest of the One Accord process. Referring
back to the SNF developed for the DEC v. Riverside Pulp & Paper case, the
following issues must be resolved: (1) type of scrubber; (2) guarantee
provided by DEC; (3) subsidy provided by DEC; (4) liability insurance
provided by DEC; (5) plant closure; (6) DEC-funded publicity; and (7)
compliance incentive provided by DEC.
14 See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, LECTURES ON NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS (1996).
15 See generally JUERGEN HANSEN, TABLE MANNERS FOR ROUND TABLES: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CONSENSUS (1995).
16 See generally David Brin, Disputation Arenas: Harnessing Conflict and
Competitiveness for Society's Benefit, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 597 (1999).
17 See id. at 611-12; see also HANSEN, supra note 15, at 10.
18 See HANSEN, supra note 15, at 10-11, 15.
19 See id. at 10.
20 See Brin, supra note 16, at 612-14; see also HANSEN, supra note 15, at 11-12.
21 See HANSEN, supra note 15, at 17, 45-46.
22 See RAIFFA, supra note 14, at 50.
23 See id.
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The facilitator will play a key role in assisting the parties in the process
of building the SNF and in ensuring that parties both assert their settlement
needs and listen to the needs of the other parties.
B. Entering Shared Information into One Accord
Having completed an initial draft of the SNF, the parties or facilitator can
enter the information from the SNF into One Accord's shared information
window, as illustrated in Figure 2.24 The shared information window
organizes the following three aspects of a negotiation case: parties, issues,
and versions. The most important thing is missing-the goal; the final
resolution. A final resolution is achieved by all parties (in this case, two
parties) agreeing on a decision to be implemented on each of the issues. Each
combination of the possible outcomes is called a "package." 25 Any party may
form a package that can become an offer or counteroffer from that party.
ie Version Party Issue Group Package Preferences Generate
1 01189 0:53 ( is 1:11
Figure 2: Shared Information
One Accord's shared information window has three panes, as follows: one for listing parties,
one for issues or case variables, and one for versions. There is no theoretical limit to the
number of parties or issues that can be added to a negotiation case.
24 Normally, only one party or the facilitator will enter the shared information, and
then it will give the access codes to other parties. Thereafter, linked by the One Accord
neutral site on the Internet, the shared information is available to all parties.
25 See INTERNEG Glossary (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://intemeg.org/intemeg/
reference/glossary.html>.
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C. How the One Accord Process Uses "Packages"
In cases such as the one illustrated in this Article, with many issues and
many possible options for each issue, thousands or even millions of
significantly different packages are possible. In fact, research shows that
there are often so many combinations that parties rarely find an optimal
one.26 The ultimate goal of One Accord is not to merely find a good package,
but rather to find an optimal one-fair, efficient, and acceptable to the
parties. Because the package concept is key to understanding how One
Accord works, the use of packages in the One Accord process is summarized
below, highlighting (in regular roman typeface) each reference to a package.
After the entry of the shared information, the negotiating parties work
privately with One Accord to better understand their negotiation problem,
enter their confidential preferences, and create packages for use in the
negotiation process. Through analysis of private and confidential
preferences for outcome, the One Accord software learns how a party
becomes satisfied on issues. With that information, One Accord can calculate
a rating for each package.
A party initially might create private packages to compare with other
packages in order to form and refine ideas about its confidential negotiation
aspirations or its minimum acceptable levels of resolution. Various types of
published packages also are created during the process. When a package is
"published, " it is sent to every other negotiating party and displayed on each
party's screen so that each party can see the issue values that compose it. A
party may publish a package for discussion purposes only and optionally
declare a confidential acceptance. If two parties accept the same package
they have a deal.
If a party openly declares a package as acceptable for implementation it
is called a proposal. Using the Internet to exchange proposals and counter-
proposals, the parties can make and seek concessions. If parties reach an
impasse, One Accord might be able to solve the impasse by generating an
equivalent for each party. The goal of this part of the One Accord process is
to reach a tentative agreement and then to look for improvements in search
of an optimal solution that will become the final agreement.
VII. QUANTIFY SATISFACTION
Returning to the DEC v. Riverside Pulp & Paper case, we assume that
the parties have established a mutually acceptable shared description of their
26 See generally Ernest M. Thiessen et al., Computer-Assisted Negotiation of Water
Resources Conflicts, 7 GROUP DECISION & NEGOTIATION 109 (1998).
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negotiation problem, 27 and each commences entering private information
independently at their own location. The goal of this phase is for facilitators
to help parties describe their preferences in a way that enables them to
evaluate negotiation options easily.
Figure 3 is a screen shot of One Accord's "Package Editor," illustrating
the bargaining ranges defined by Riverside. Displayed are two hypothetical
packages, the worst on the left and the best on the right. This is how the
negotiation problem would look like from Riverside's point of view. 28
Scrubber
Guarantee
Subsidy ($1000)
MjU
Liability ($1000)
Plant Closure
• ..
Publicity ($1000 "
Incentive ($1000) -
Figure 3: Bargaining Ranges Defined by Riverside
One Accord's Package Editor is used for displaying and editing packages within defined
bargaining ranges. One Accord orients the ranges so that preferred values for each issue
appear on the right-hand side29
27 In an actual case, the parties may have further joint sessions or teleconferences
from time to time to better define the problem and modify and improve the SNF.
28 In the remainder of the illustration, the process is described from Riverside's
perspective. All screen shots show how One Accord appears on Riverside's computer
monitor.
29 The reader might look at the values on the right-hand side and recognize that it
would be impossible for DEC to guarantee a scrubber if the "no scrubber" option was
chosen. Parties can program One Accord to deal with such infeasible conditions with
constraints. Detailed discussion of constraints is beyond the scope of this Article.
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The worst package possible within defined bargaining ranges is usually
below a negotiating party's minimum acceptable level-lower than the value
of what that party expects to achieve if no agreement is reached. Riverside
expects to litigate with DEC if no satisfactory agreement can be found in this
current negotiation with One Accord. Figure 4 shows a package with
decision values that Riverside might expect in court. This assessment is
Riverside's best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA).30
Consequently, Riverside believes that it must achieve a better result than its
BATNA in negotiations with DEC.
Scrubber
Guaantee
Subsidy ($1000)
Liability ($1000)
Plant Closure
Publicity ($1000)
incentive($1000)
Figure 4: Walkaway to Court
Displayed here is a private package with the resolutions that Riverside expects from a
resolution of the conflict in court. This package represents Riverside's BATNA and is a
satisfaction level below which Riverside would walk away from negotiations.
The values displayed in Figure 4 do not represent a fixed bottom line for
each issue. Rather, there are many packages that could represent a minimum
acceptable level for Riverside. Riverside's objective is not to get better
resolutions on each individual issue, but rather to agree upon a
comprehensive settlement package that results in greater satisfaction and
30 See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 97-106 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991).
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value than some defined minimum acceptable level (such as Riverside's
BATNA). Therein lies a key strength of the One Accord software-to permit
a party to look at packages analytically and comprehensively.
Riverside will determine the acceptability of any particular package by
assessing the tradeoffs between issues and between options for particular
issues. The One Accord satisfaction graphs model a party's satisfaction on
individual issues. 31 The One Accord depiction for a particular issue depends
on whether the issue is qualitative or quantitative. Potential outcomes on
qualitative issues are represented by different options, whereas quantitative
issues are measured within quantitative ranges. Figure 5 illustrates
Riverside's satisfaction graph for the Scrubber issue, which is an example of
a qualitative issue with three options.
Figure 5: A Qualitative Issue Called "Scrubber"
The Scrubber issue is a qualitative issue with the following three defined options:
Technoclean, Rotoblue, or no scrubber. Issues with discrete options are represented in One
Accord with bar graphs. The height of each bar represents its relative value, or importance, to
a party as compared to the other options. In this case, Riverside's engineers have informed the
Riverside negotiators that the difference between a Technoclean and no scrubber would be
31 How a party becomes satisfied on a particular issue often depends on outcomes
for other issues. How One Accord deals with interdependencies is not addressed in this
Article.
1I0 Issue Importancepercent
Scrubber1914 di Ift-3 [M.13
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$300,000. Deciding to measure issue importance in terms of thousands of dollars, this issue is
assigned an importance of 300.
Figure 6 illustrates the satisfaction graph for the quantitative subsidy
issue. This issue resolves the question of whether and how much of a
technology subsidy DEC would provide to Riverside in a settlement. The
satisfaction graph, shown in Figure 6, is a simple, straight line. However,
when using One Accord, a party has the option to define points along a curve
to represent any complex, nonlinear shape.
"N Saifato Graph
Lqil ~Isue Importance
Subsidy ($1000) I
Figure 6: A Quantitative Issue Called "Subsidy"
The subsidy issue is a quantitative issue with a bargaining range defined between $0 and
$450,000. With issue importance measured in thousands of dollars and the satisfaction graph
being a simple, straight line, the importance for this issue is 450.
The importance assigned to each issue is a relative measure of the
tradeoffs among issues. Direct specification of relative importance for the
issues may, as described above, seem quite straightforward. However, many
percent
~I I
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decisionmakers have great difficulties accurately specifying the relative
importance among issues merely by referring to a list of issues.32
Fortunately, there exists another solution that is rational and powerful yet
so simple and elegant that it has withstood the test of time. More than two
centuries ago, Benjamin Franklin outlined his approach to the challenge in a
letter to his friend and noted scientist Joseph Priestly, who was trying to
choose between two alternatives.33 This charming letter is a must read for
every decisionmaker.
Franklin's method compared the pros and cons of an issue, striking out
combinations that were approximately equal in importance. 34 He continued
to make such cancellations until one side, either pro or con, prevailed.35 The
obvious limitation of this method was the need for approximations when pros
and cons were not exactly balanced.
Although many situations can accommodate this lack of precision and
still produce good results, One Accord's preference elicitation
methodology 36  overcomes that limitation. One Accord provides a
mechanism, called "even swaps,"37 that allows a decisionmaker to define the
relative importance of issues by creating a hypothetical set of equivalent
alternative packages. These equivalent packages then are used for
comparison purposes and to adjust the relative importance assigned to each
negotiation issue.
Parties' negotiation preferences are dynamic rather than static. As such,
they may change radically over the course of negotiations as information is
exchanged and the problem description evolves. Therefore, adjustments to
preferences made during the One Accord process are as important as the
initial estimations of preferences. In practice, therefore, a party may be
satisfied with rough approximations of their preferences in the early stages of
negotiation. That party later may fine-tune its preferences as the negotiation
progresses.
32 See John S. Hammond et al., Even Swaps: A Rational Method for Making Trade-
offs, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 137, 137 (stating that "[miaking wise trade-
offs is one of the most important... challenges in decision making").
33 See id. at 148.
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 See Ernest M. Thiessen & Daniel P. Loucks, Computer-Assisted Negotiation of
Multi-Objective Water Resources Conflicts, 28 WATER RESOURCES BuLL. 163, 165-66
(1992).
37 
'Even swaps" is a method of eliciting tradeoffs between two issues by identifying
a change in one of the issues that exactly balances a change in the other issue in terms of
satisfaction to the decisionmaker. See id.; see also Hammond et al., supra note 32, at 137
(using the term "even swaps" to describe a similar methodology for simplifying tradeoffs
that can be employed without computer assistance).
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VIII. ESTABLISH EQUITY
With jointly identified issues and ranges of possible outcomes but
individually determined preferences, the next step is to establish equity, that
is, to agree on how the benefits should be divided among the parties. An
experienced facilitator will be helpful to parties as they choose among
various available routines to exchange packages via One Accord's Internet
connections.
A. Opening Proposals
The One Accord process encourages parties to make optimistic opening
proposals. Research has shown that this strategy is by far the most
successful. 38 In our case, the optimistic packages proposed by each party are
illustrated by Figure 7. Both parties are prepared to be flexible with respect
to these proposals.
, , I II .iD
ISetubbes rV Sol~1 DECI
;-- --- - A IL .. . __ .... r i_" _ -
Privat e esd
suaotsee -. J WW Wast
: rissre" {s.oM1 W- "way t
Pkli ,ty ($1 01)
Incentive ($1000
Figure 7: Initial Optimistic Proposals
Listed in the "Proposals" group in the right pane are "DEC 1 " and "Riverside 1. These
packages are the initial optimistic39 proposals from each party. Their issue values4° are
displayed in the left pane. DEC 1 has a rating of negative 758. Because Riverside is
38See RicHARD G. SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADvANTAGE: NEGOTIATION
STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 165 (1999).
39 The term "optimistic" as used here means that the party making the proposal does
not really expect it to be accepted and is prepared to make further concessions.
4 0 By definition, a complete package is composed of a set of "issue values." An
issue value is a possible decision for the subject issue.
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measuring satisfaction in terms of thousands of dollars, this rating implies a cost of $758,000.
This sum is more than DEC would expect to pay if the outcome was decided in court. On the
other hand, the proposal identified as Riverside I would cost Riverside only $362,000.41
B. Divisions
"Division" is an item under the One Accord "Generate" menu that
attempts to generate a compromise package that would give each party an
average level of satisfaction compared to current party proposals. If parties
agree that they are equally distant from a fair solution, this division is
perceived to be fairer than simply splitting the difference on every issue.
Another One Accord function, called "Multiple Division," will generate a
series of packages to fill in the holes between proposals least acceptable to
each party. Division functionality is not illustrated in this example.
C. Equivalent Packages
At any time during the One Accord process, either party can request One
Accord to generate an equivalent package. A certain package is equivalent to
another package if each of them would produce the same level of satisfaction
to a particular party. When generating an equivalent package, One Accord
uses the least acceptable package for each party as a reference. Early in the
negotiation process, when parties are still relatively far from resolution, this
routine assists parties in fine-tuning their preferences. Later in the process,
the equivalent function can help parties solve an impasse, as illustrated in the
next subpart.
D. Dealing with an Apparent Impasse
The hypothetical at this point in the One Accord process assumes that the
negotiation dance has reached the point of impasse. Figure 8 illustrates the
impasse as seen from Riverside's private point of view. Figure 9 plots this
impasse in "satisfaction space." 42
41 The white dot is a private marker, indicating acceptance. It may be put on any
package, whether private or published. By definition, a proposal will always have a white
dot.
42 
"Satisfaction space" describes a graphical plot of one party's satisfaction ratings
for packages against another party's satisfaction ratings for those packages.
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Figure 8: Impasse
"DEC 2" and "Riverside 2" are supposedly final offers made by each party. The negotiators
for each party think that they can go no further. The issue values of both packages are
displayed in the left pane. Riverside's proposal is displayed on top. As shown in the left pane,
the two packages are different only on the guarantee issue. Riverside wants a guarantee but
DEC is unwilling to give one.
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Figure 9: Impasse in Satisfaction Space
The same two packages that are displayed in Figure 8 are plotted here in satisfaction space.
The ratings shown on the vertical (Y) axis are the same as those seen by Riverside in its
private view in Figure 8. The composite view, however, is known only at the neutral One
Accord Internet site and is not communicated to either party.
In this hypothetical, the parties tentatively have agreed on everything
except the guarantee issue. Riverside contends that there is no way that it can
agree to a Technoclean without a guarantee, particularly in light of
Riverside's prior concessions in this negotiation. Similarly, DEC contends
that that it cannot give the requested guarantee because DEC already has
made other substantial concessions. It is not possible to split the difference
on the guarantee issue because the only options are yes or no. Therefore, this
impasse looks like it could lead to a win-lose or even a lose-lose situation.
The difference is really not that great to either party, but either one giving in
would suffer loss of face. Can One Accord be used to solve the impasse? The
answer is shown in Figure 10.
F 'icioncy
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Figure 10: Equivalent in Satisfaction Space
The impasse positions of DEC and Riverside, as plotted here and in Figure 9, are close
enough for One Accord to be able to generate an equivalent package, i.e., one that would
provide each party with the same value as its current proposal.
By this time, Riverside's preferences are quite well represented and the
equivalent package is easily accepted. After all, it would provide the same
satisfaction as Riverside's last proposal. Unbeknownst to Riverside, DEC has
received the identical package and for similar reasons also accepts it. Their
win-win deal is illustrated in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Equivalent Solves Impasse
From Riverside's point of view, the generated equivalent package and Riverside's last
proposal each have a rating of negative -545. The equivalent is in the tentative group,
indicating that both parties already have accepted it.
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IX. Maximize Benefits
Seeking to find an even better resolution, the parties now request
improvements from One Accord. Another package is generated, as illustrated
in Figures 12 and 13.
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Figure 12: Improvement
One Accord has generated an improvement to the tentative solution. The improvement is being
compared to Riverside's final proposal. According to the ratings, the improvement is better by
almost ninety points. If both parties accept it, it will become the new tentative solution.
The improvement generated by One Accord is worth nearly $100,000
more to Riverside than the current tentative agreement. Riverside readily
accepts it. Because One Accord attempts to divide benefits fairly to each
party, DEC also sees significant improvements and accepts the improved
package. In this hypothetical, the improved package generated by One
Accord becomes the framework for a final, written settlement agreement.
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Figure 13: Improvement in Satisfaction Space
The generated improvement, plotted on the efficiency frontier, is better by almost ninety points
for each party. In this hypothetical research case, for ease of comparison, the same scale was
used to measure satisfaction for each party. In application of One Accord to real cases, each
party chooses satisfaction scales independently. Resulting ratings remain confidential and are
never compared by anybody
X. CONCLUSIONS
The authors have presented a new negotiating process made possible
with the One Accord negotiation support system. Preliminary research shows
significant potential for negotiating parties to gain from using such systems.
In a Cornell study with a similarly complex case, the average gains were
sixteen percent for each party.43 In the authors' opinion, this process will
reduce time, cost, and stress if parties pay attention to avoiding the pitfalls
that often exhaust conventional negotiators.44
The facilitated negotiation described in this paper is intended both to (1)
encourage mutual gains bargaining and (2) work toward the goal of Pareto
efficiency in negotiation. The One Accord process, when used with a skilled
neutral, can encourage both goals. As with any technology, it cannot
mechanically be applied to complex situations. The effective use of this
process involves many of the principles underlying mutual gains bargaining,
43 See Thiessen et al., supra note 26, at 109.
44 See SHELL, supra note 38, at 165 (reporting from his own research that when most
negotiators had finished "a hotly contested, complex deal, they were tired and wanted to
stop" rather than participate in a postsettlement settlement exercise).
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effective mediation, and facilitation. The software is no substitute for proper
preparation and thoughtful participation in negotiation. However, the
structure proposed and One Accord software work in synergy with, rather
than supplanting, those basic negotiation principles. Multiparty and multi-
issue negotiations are frequent and usually complex. These tools and
processes can take parties to a place of effectively viewing their options and
making the best possible decisions in negotiation.

